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This paper studies the Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games. We address
the following issue: for a general problem formulation, is there any utility allocation
method ensuring a Nash-stable partition? We propose the definition of the Nash-stable
core. We study the conditions for having a non-empty Nash-stable core. More precisely,
we show how relaxed efficiency in utility sharing method allows to ensure a non-empty
Nash-stable core.
Keywords:
1. Introduction
Any cooperation among agents (players) being able to make strategic decisions be-
comes a coalition formation game when the players –for various individual reasons–
may wish to belong to a relative small coalition rather than the “grand coalition”a.
Players’ moves from one to another coalition are governed by a set of rules. Basi-
cally, a user will move to a new coalition when it may obtain a better utility from
this coalition. We shall not consider in this paper some permission requirements,
which means that a player is always accepted by a coalition to which the player is
willing to join. Based on those rules, the crucial question in the game context is how
a stable partition occurs. In the following, we study the hedonic coalition formation
games and the stability notion that we analyze is the Nash stability.
aThe grand coalition is the set of all agents.
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A coalition formation game is called to be hedonic if each player’s preferences
over partitions of players depend only on the members of his/her coalition. Find-
ing a stable coalition partition is the main question in a coalition formation game.
We refer to H. Aziz and F. Brandl [2012] discussing the stability concepts asso-
ciated to hedonic conditions. In the sequel, we concentrate on the Nash stability.
The definition of the Nash stability is quite simple: a partition of players is Nash
stable whenever no player deviates from his/her coalition to another coalition in the
partition.
1.1. Related Work
In K. R. Apt and A. Witzel [2009], the authors propose an approach to coalition
formation that focuses on simple merge and split stability rules transforming par-
titions of a group of players. The results are parametrized by a preference relation
between partitions from the point of view of each player. In H. Keina¨nen, [2010] , the
problem of generating Nash-stable solutions in coalitional games is considered. In
particular, the authors proposed an algorithm for constructing the set of all Nash-
stable coalition structures from players’ preferences in a given additively separable
hedonic game. In F. Bloch and E. Diamantoudi, [2011] , a bargaining procedure of
coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend
solely on the coalition they belong to is studied. The authors provide an example
of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium, and a necessary
and sufficient condition for existence. They show that when the game is totally
stable (the game and all its restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists
a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria exhibiting delay
or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game
and its restrictions always consist of a single point, it is shown that the bargaining
game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the immediate
formation of the core coalition structure.
In J. Dre`ze and J. Greenberg, [1980], Dre`ze and Greenberg introduced the he-
donic feature in players’ preferences in a context concerning local public goods.
Moreover, purely hedonic games and stability of hedonic coalition partitions were
studied by Bogomolnaia and Jackson in A. Bogomonlaia and M. Jackson, [2002].
In this paper, it is proved that if players’ preferences are additively separable and
symmetric, then a Nash stable coalition partition exists. For further discussion on
additively separable and symmetric preferences, we refer the reader to N. Burani,
and W. S. Zwicker, [2003]. Top responsiveness, which is a condition on players’ pref-
erences, captures the idea of how each player believes that others could complement
her in the formation of research teams. In J. Alcalde and P. Revilla, [2004], it is
shown that top responsiveness is sufficient for the existence of core stable parti-
tions. The work in D. Dimitrov and S. C. Sung, [2006] discusses the existence of
Nash-stable partitions in hedonic games possessing top responsiveness property. As
shown by the authors, imposing a mutuality condition is sufficient for the existence.
July 3, 2018 1:31 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ppijgtr
3
In this work, we study the following problem: having coalitions associated with
their utilities, which is called as transferable utility games, we seek the answer of
how must the coalition utilities be allocated to the players in order to obtain a
stable coalition partition. The fundamental question is to determine which utility
allocation methods may ensure a Nash-stable partition. We first propose the defini-
tion of the Nash-stable core which is the set of all possible utility allocation methods
resulting in Nash-stable partitions. We show that efficient utility allocations where
the utility of a group is completely shared between his/her members, may have no
Nash-stable partitions with only a few exceptions. Rather, we prove that relaxing
the efficiency condition may ensure the non-emptiness of the core. Indeed, we prove
that if the sum of players’ gains within a coalition is allowed to be less than the
utility of this coalition, then a Nash-stable partition always exists.
2. Hedonic Coalition Formation
2.1. Definition
A coalition formation game is given by a pair 〈N,〉, where N is the set of n players
and = (1,2, . . . ,n) denotes the preference profile, specifying for each player
i ∈ N his preference relation i, i.e. a reflexive, complete and transitive binary
relation.
Definition 1. A coalition structure or a coalition partition is a set Π =
{S1, . . . , Sl} which partitions the players set N , i.e., ∀k, Sk ⊂ N are disjoint coali-
tions such that
⋃l
k=1 Sk = N . Given Π and i, let SΠ(i) denote the set Sk ∈ Π such
that i ∈ Sk.
In its partition form, a coalition formation game is defined on the set N by
associating a utility value u(S|Π) to each subset of any partition Π of N . In its
characteristic form, the utility value of a set is independent of the other coalitions,
and therefore, u(S|Π) = u(S). The games of this form are more restrictive but
present interesting properties to reach an equilibrium. Practically speaking, this
assumption means that the gain of a group is independent of the other players
outside the group.
Hedonic coalition formation games fall into this category with an additional
assumption:
Definition 2. A coalition formation game is said hedonic if
• the gain of any player depends solely on the members of the coalition to
which the player belongs, and
• the coalitions arise as a result of the preferences of the players over their
possible coalitions’ set.
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2.2. Preference relation
The preference relation of a player can be defined over a preference function. Let
us denote by pii : 2
N → < the preference function of player i. Thus, player i prefers
the coalition S to T iff,
pii(S) ≥ pii(T )⇔ S i T. (1)
We consider the case where the preference relation is chosen to be the utility
allocated to the player in a coalition, then pii(S) = φ
S
i where φ
S
i refers to the utility
received by player i in coalition S.
In the case of transferable utility games (TU games), as we are considering in
this paper, the utility of a group can be transfered among users in any way. Thus,
an utility allocation is said relatively efficient if for each coalition S, the sum of
individual utilities is equal to the coalition utility:
∑
i∈S φ
S
i = u(S),∀S ⊆ N .
Now, if the preferences of a player are additively separable, the preference can
be even stated with a function characterizing how a player prefers another player
in each coalition. This means that the player’s preference for a coalition is based on
individual preferences. This can be formalized as follows:
Definition 3. The preferences of a player are said to be additively separable if
there exists a function vi : N → < s.t. ∀S, T ⊆ N∑
j∈S
vi(j) ≥
∑
j∈T
vi(j)⇔ S i T (2)
where vi(i) is normalized and set to vi(i) = 0 .
A profile of additively separable preferences, represented by (vi, . . . , vn), satisfies
symmetry if vi(j) = vj(i),∀i, j.
2.3. The Nash stability
The question we address in this paper concerns the stability of this kind of games.
The stability concept for a coalition formation game may receive different defini-
tions. In the literature, a game is either said individually stable, Nash stable, core
stable, strict core stable, Pareto optimal, strong Nash stable, strict strong Nash sta-
ble. We refer to H. Aziz and F. Brandl [2012] for a thorough definition of these
different stability concepts.
In this paper, we concentrate only on the Nash stability. The definition of the
Nash stability for an hedonic coalition formation game is simply
Definition 4 (Nash Stability). A partition of players is Nash-stable whenever
no player is incentive to unilaterally change his or her coalition to another coalition
in the partition which can be mathematically formulated as:
partition Π is said to be Nash-stable if no player can benefit from
moving from his coalition SΠ(i) to another existing coalition Sk,
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i.e.:
∀i, k : SΠ(i) i Sk ∪ {i};Sk ∈ Π ∪ {∅}. (3)
Nash-stable partitions are immune to individual movements even when a player
who wants to change does not need permission to join or leave an existing coalition
A. Bogomonlaia and M. Jackson, [2002].
Remark 1. In the literature (A. Bogomonlaia and M. Jackson, [2002]; J. Haj-
dukova´, [2006]), the stability concepts being immune to individual deviation are
Nash stability, individual stability, contractual individual stability. Nash stability is
the strongest within above. The notion of core stability has been used already in
some models where immunity to coalition deviation is required J. Hajdukova´, [2006].
But the Nash-stable core has not been defined yet at the best of our knowledge.
This is what we derive in the next section.
Remark 2 (Impossibility of a stability concept). In S. Barber and A. Gerber,
[2007], the authors propose some set of axioms which are non-emptiness, symmetry
pareto optimality, self-consistency ; and they analyze the existence of any stability
concept that can satisfy these axioms. It is proven that for any game |N | > 2, there
does not exist any solution which satisfies these axioms.
In this work, we do not seek finding conditions which satisfy the above-mentioned
axioms, but rather, we show how only non-emptiness can be guaranteed using Nash
stability as a solution concept.
3. The Nash-stable Core
3.1. Definition
Consider a hedonic TU game noted 〈N, u,〉 (since u is transferable to the players,
we consider hedonic coalition formation games based on transferable utility). For
the sake of simplicity, the preference function pii of player i is assumed to be the
gain obtained in the corresponding coalition, i.e., pii(S) ≡ φSi ,∀i ∈ S, ∀S ⊆ N . We
denote the allocation method as Φ = {φSi ;∀i ∈ S,∀S ⊆ N} ∈ Rκ where κ = n2n−1.
Note that any allocation method shall create a preference profile.
Define the mapping M : Rκ → P∪∅, where P is the set of all possible partitions.
Clearly, for any preference function, the mapping M finds the set of Nash-stable
partition Π, i.e. M(Φ) := {Π |Nash-stable}. If a Nash-stable partition cannot be
found, M maps to empty set. Moreover, the preimage of the mapping M is denoted
as M−1(Π ∈ P) which finds the set of all possible preference functions that converge
to a Nash-stable partition Π. Thus, the Nash-stable core includes all those efficient
allocation methods that build the following set:
N -core = {Φ ∈ Rκ |∃Π ∈ P ;M−1 (Π) 3 Φ} . (4)
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3.2. Non-emptiness
We define the set of constraints of a partition function. Efficiency constraint dictates
the following:
CEfficient(Φ) :=
{∑
i∈S
φSi = u(S),∀S ⊆ N
}
. (5)
Given allocation method Φ, we have the following constraints ensuring the Nash
stability:
CNash-stable(Φ) :=
{
φ
SM(Φ)(i)
i ≥ φT∪ii ,∀T ∈ M(Φ) ∪ ∅,∀i ∈ N
}
, (6)
where SM(Φ)(i) is the unique set in M(Φ) containing i. Then, the N -core is non-
empty, iif:
∃Φ∗ : CEfficient(Φ∗) and CNash-stable(Φ∗). (7)
The N -core is defined as
N -core = {Φ ∈ Rκ : CEfficient(Φ) and CNash-stable(Φ)} , (8)
which allows us to conclude:
Theorem 1. The N -core can be non-empty.
Proof. The N -core is non-empty if the following linear program is feasible:
min
Φ∈Rκ
{ ∑
∀S⊆N
∑
∀i∈S
φSi subject to CEfficient(Φ) and CNash-stable(Φ)
}
, (9)
where we basically use optimization to find allocation methods which result in
Nash-stable partitions.
It may be hard to find non-emptiness of the Nash-stable core in the general case.
Searching in an exhaustive manner over the whole partitions is NP-complete as the
number of partitions grows according to the Bell number. Typically, with only 10
players, the number of partitions is as large as 115, 975.
We now analyze some specific cases in the following.
3.3. Grand Coalition Stability Conditions
When the grand coalition Π = {N} is targeted, the stability conditions are the
following:
φNi ≥ u(i),∀i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N
φNi = u(N). (10)
It is adequate to have u(N) ≥ ∑i∈N u(i) for the existence of allocation method
guaranteeing the grand coalition. Those cooperative TU games that satisfy this
condition are said to be essential.
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3.4. Symmetric Relative Gain
We propose to formulate a special case where the utility is shared among players
with an equal relative gain. Let us denote the gain of player i in coalition S as
φSi = u(i) + δ
S
i in which δ
S
i is called the relative gain. Note that for player i, one
must have δii = 0. The preference relation can be determined w.r.t. the relative
gain, i.e.,
δSi ≥ δTi ⇔ S i T. (11)
The total allocated utilities in coalition S is
∑
i∈S φ
S
i =
∑
i∈S u(i) +
∑
i∈S δ
S
i =
u(S). Therefore,
∑
i∈S δ
S
i = u(S)−
∑
i∈S u(i) = ∆(S), where ∆(S) is the clustering
profit due to coalition S. The symmetric relative gain sharing relies on equally
dividing the clustering profit in a coalition, i.e.
δSi =
∆(S)
|S| , ∀i ∈ S. (12)
This choice means that each player in coalition S has the same gain.
Corollary 1. Equivalent Evaluation: Assume that S ∩ T 6= ∅. Due to (12), the
following holds:
∆(S)
|S| ≥
∆(T )
|T | ⇔ S i T ∀i ∈ S ∩ T. (13)
It means that all players in S ∩T prefer coalition S to T whenever the relative gain
in S is higher than T .
For this particular case, we have the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. A game with two players N = (1, 2) always possesses a Nash-stable
partition in case of symmetric relative gain.
Proof. see appendix 1.
Lemma 2. A game with three players N = (1, 2, 3) always possesses a Nash-stable
partition in case of symmetric relative gain.
Proof. see appendix 2.
Thus, we can conclude that symmetric relative gain always results in a Nash-
stable partition when n ≤ 3. However, this is not the case when n > 3. We can find
many counter examples that justify it such as the following one:
Counter Example 3.1. Let the clustering profit for all possible S be as following:
∆(1, 2) = 0.86,∆(1, 3) = 0.90,∆(1, 4) = 0.87,∆(2, 3) = −1.22,
∆(2, 4) = −1.25,∆(3, 4) = −1.21,∆(1, 2, 3) = 0.27,∆(1, 2, 4) = 0.24,
∆(1, 3, 4) = 0.28,∆(2, 3, 4) = −1.84,∆(1, 2, 3, 4) = −0.35. (14)
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Let us now generate the preference profile according to these clustering profit values.
Note that we could eliminate those clustering profit values which are negative since
a player will prefer to be alone instead of a negative relative gain. Further, ranking
the positive relative gains in a descending order results in the following sequence:[
∆(1, 3)
2
,
∆(1, 4)
2
,
∆(1, 2)
2
,
∆(1, 3, 4)
3
,
∆(1, 2, 3)
3
,
∆(1, 2, 4)
3
]
. (15)
According to the ranking sequence, we are able to generate the preference list of
each player:
(1, 3) 1 (1, 4) 1 (1, 2) 1 (1, 3, 4) 1 (1, 2, 3) 1 (1, 2, 4) 1 (1)
(1, 2) 2 (1, 2, 3) 2 (1, 2, 4) 2 (2)
(1, 3) 3 (1, 3, 4) 3 (1, 2, 3) 3 (3)
(1, 4) 4 (1, 3, 4) 4 (1, 2, 4) 4 (4). (16)
Note that this preference profile does not admit any Nash-stable partition. Thus, we
conclude that symmetric relative gain allocation does not provide always a Nash-
stable partition when n > 3.
3.5. Additively Separable and Symmetric Utility Case
We now focus on the case of separable and symmetric utilities. Consider equation
(2) meaning that player i gains vi(j) from player j in any coalition. In case of
symmetry, vi(j) = vj(i) = v(i, j) such that v(i, i) = 0. Further, we denote as
φSi = u(i) +
∑
j∈S v(i, j) the utility that player i gains in coalition S. Then, the
sum of allocated utilities in coalition S is given by∑
i∈S
φSi =
∑
i,j∈S
v(i, j) +
∑
i∈S
u(i) = u(S). (17)
Let us point out that
∑
i,j∈S v(i, j) = 2
∑
i,j∈S:j>i v(i, j) (for example, S = (1, 2, 3),∑
i,j∈S v(i, j) = 2[v(1, 2) + v(1, 3) + v(2, 3)]). Therefore, the following determines
the existence of additively separable and symmetric preferences when the utility
function u is allocated to the players:
∑
i,j∈S:j>i
v(i, j) =
1
2
(
u(S)−
∑
i∈S
u(i)
)
. (18)
Finding the values of v(i, j) satisfying these constraints are strongly restrictive and
are rarely observed in real problems. Let it be illustrated for example N = (1, 2, 3).
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The constraints imposed are:
v(1, 2) =
1
2
[u(1, 2)− u(1)− u(2)],
v(1, 3) =
1
2
[u(1, 3)− u(1)− u(3)],
v(2, 3) =
1
2
[u(2, 3)− u(2)− u(3)],
v(1, 2) + v(1, 3) + v(2, 3) =
1
2
[u(1, 2, 3)− u(1)− u(2)− u(3)]. (19)
We have 3 variables and 4 constraints; thus, only special problem may fit with all
the constraints. A more general approach allows to state the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The N -core of the additively separable and symmetric utility hedonic
game is non-empty if there exist balanced weights of the dual problem (balancedness
conditions):
∃{wS ,∀S ∈ 2N} : (20)∑
S∈2N
wS∆(S) ≤ ∆(N),∑
S∈2N :V(k)∈S
wS = 1, ∀k ∈ I,
wS ∈ [−∞,∞] ∀S ∈ 2N . (21)
Proof. According to Bondareva-Shapley theorem O. N. Bondareva, [1963]; L. S.
Shapley, [1967] when the gains of players are allocated according to the additively
separable and symmetric way, we have
• V the all possible bipartite coalitions such that V := {(i, j) ∈ 2N : j > i}.
Note that |V| = n(n− 1)/2.
• I the index set of all possible bipartite coalitions. So, V(k ∈ I) is the kth
bipartite coalition.
• v = (v(i, j))(i,j)∈V ∈ R|V| which is the vector demonstration of all v(i, j).
• 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R|V|.
• b = (bS)S∈2N ∈ R2n such that bS = 12∆(S) where ∆(S) = u(S)−
∑
i∈S u(i).
• A = (aS,k)S∈2N ,k∈I ∈ R2n×|V| is a matrix such that aS,k = 1{S : V(k) ∈
S}.
By using these definitions, the N -core is non-empty whenever the following linear
program is feasible
(L) min 1v subject to
Av = b,v ∈ [−∞,∞]. (22)
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The linear program that is dual to (L) is given by
(Lˆ) max wb subject to
wA = 1,w ∈ [−∞,∞], (23)
where w = (wS)S∈2N ∈ R2n denote the vector of dual variables. Let Ak denote the
kth column of A. Then wA implies
wAk =
∑
S∈2N
wSaS,k =
∑
S∈2N :V(k)∈S
wS = 1, ∀k ∈ I. (24)
This result means that the feasible solutions of (Lˆ) exactly correspond to the vec-
tors containing balancing weights for balanced families. More precisely, when w is
feasible in (Lˆ), Bw is a balanced family with balancing weights (wS)S∈Bw .
According to the weak duality theorem, the objective function value of the primal
(L) at any feasible solution is always greater than or equal to the objective function
value of the dual (Lˆ) at any feasible solution, i.e. 1v ≥ wb which implies
1v =
∑
k∈I
vk =
∑
∀S∈2N
∑
i,j∈S:j>i
v(i, j) =
1
2
∆(N) (25)
and
wb =
1
2
∑
S∈2N
wS∆(S) ≤ 1
2
∆(N). (26)
Combining these results, we have the following balancedness conditions of u:∑
S∈2N
wS∆(S) ≤ ∆(N),∑
S∈2N :V(k)∈S
wS = 1, ∀k ∈ I,
wS ∈ [−∞,∞] ∀S ∈ 2N . (27)
However, these conditions are very restrictive. For a given set of players n, the
number of variables is strictly equal to
(
2
n
)
= n(n − 1)/2 while the number of
constraints is equal to the number of sets, i.e. 2n − 1. For n = 10, we have 45
variables and as much as 512 constraints.
3.6. Relaxed Efficiency
Considering the former result, we look at additively separable and symmetric utility
case, by relaxing the efficiency constraint. Clearly, we relax the constraint of having
the sum of allocated utilities in a coalition to be strictly equal to the utility of the
coalition, i.e.
∑
i∈S φ
S
i ≤ u(S) which leads to∑
i,j∈S:j>i
v(i, j) ≤ 1
2
∆(S), ∀S ∈ 2N . (28)
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The motivation behind relaxed efficiency can be the following: in case of the indi-
vidual deviations, we do not favor the group interest; therefore, we can relax the
efficiency condition (thus, we call it relaxed efficiency). It may be even interpreted
as penalizing some coalitions to form. Thus, the following theorem may be stated:
Theorem 3. The N -core is always non-empty in case of relaxed efficiency.
Proof. Finding the values of v(i, j) in eq. (28) satisfying the relaxed efficiency
condition can be done straightforward. However, we propose to formulate as an
optimization problem for finding the values of v(i, j) so that
∑
(i,j)∈V v(i, j) is max-
imized.
A feasible solution of the following linear program guarantees the non-emptiness
of the N -core:
max
∑
(i,j)∈V
v(i, j) subject to
∑
i,j∈S:j>i
v(i, j) ≤ 1
2
∆(S),∀S ∈ 2N , (29)
which is equivalent to
(LRE) max 1v subject to
Av ≤ b,v ∈ [−∞,∞]. (30)
Note that (LRE) is always feasible since
• there are no any inconsistent constraints, i.e. there are no at least two rows
in A that are equivalent,
• the polytope is bounded in the direction of the gradient of the objective
function 1v.
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For example, let N = (1, 2, 3, 4). Then,
max {v(1, 2) + v(1, 3) + v(1, 4) + v(2, 3) + v(2, 4) + v(3, 4)}
subject to
v(1, 2) ≤ ∆(1, 2)
2
,
v(1, 3) ≤ ∆(1, 3)
2
,
v(1, 4) ≤ ∆(1, 4)
2
,
v(2, 3) ≤ ∆(2, 3)
2
,
v(2, 4) ≤ ∆(2, 4)
2
,
v(3, 4) ≤ ∆(3, 4)
2
,
v(1, 2) + v(1, 3) + v(2, 3) ≤ ∆(1, 2, 3)
2
,
v(1, 2) + v(1, 4) + v(2, 4) ≤ ∆(1, 2, 4)
2
,
v(1, 3) + v(1, 4) + v(3, 4) ≤ ∆(1, 3, 4)
2
,
v(1, 2) + v(1, 3) + v(2, 3) ≤ ∆(2, 3, 4)
2
,
v(1, 2) + v(1, 3) + v(1, 4) + v(2, 3) + v(2, 4) + v(3, 4) ≤ ∆(1, 2, 3, 4)
2
v(1, 2) ∈ [−∞,∞], v(1, 3) ∈ [−∞,∞], v(1, 4) ∈ [−∞,∞],
v(2, 3) ∈ [−∞,∞], v(2, 4) ∈ [−∞,∞],
v(3, 4) ∈ [−∞,∞] (31)
Note that such a linear program has always a feasible solution. Moreover, for |N | >
4, it is easily to conclude that the above linear program (LRE) is always feasible.
4. Hedonic Coalition Formation as a Non-cooperative Game
We can model the problem of finding a Nash-stable partition in hedonic coalition
formation by formulating it as a non-cooperative game. We state the following:
Theorem 4. A hedonic coalition formation game is equivalent to a non-cooperative
game.
Proof. Let us denote as Σ the set of strategies. We assume that the number of
strategies is equal to the number of players, i.e. |Σ| = |N |. This is sufficient to
represent all possible choices. Indeed, the players that select the same strategy are
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interpreted as a coalition. For example, if every player chooses different strategies,
then this corresponds to the coalition partition where every player is alone.
Consider the best-reply dynamics where in a particular step s, only one
player chooses its best strategy. A strategy tuple in step s is denoted as σs =
{σs1, σs2, . . . , σsn}, where σsi is the strategy of player i in step s. In every step, only
one dimension is changed in σs. We further denote as Π(σs) the partition in step
s. Define as S
(s)
i = {j : σsi = σsj ,∀j ∈ N} the set of players that share the same
strategy with player i. Thus, note that ∪i∈NS(s)i = N for each step. The preference
function of player i is denoted as pii (σ
s) and verifies the following equivalence:
pii (σ
s) ≥ pii
(
σs−1
)⇔ S(s)i i S(s−1)i , (32)
where player i is the one that takes its turn in step s.
5. Conclusions
In this work, we answered the following question: Is there any utility allocation
method which could result in a Nash-stable partition? We proposed the definition
of the Nash-stable core. We analyzed the cases in which the Nash-stable core is
non-empty, and prove that in case of the relaxed efficiency condition there exists
always a Nash-stable partition.
6. Appendices
6.1. Appendix 1: proof of Lemma 1
The proof is based on a simple enumeration of all possible partitions and corre-
sponding conditions of Nash stability:
(1) Π = {(1), (2)}:
0 ≥ δ121
0 ≥ δ122
δ121 + δ
12
2 = ∆(1, 2) (33)
(2) Π = {1, 2}:
0 ≤ δ121
0 ≤ δ122
δ121 + δ
12
2 = ∆(1, 2) (34)
According to Corollary 1, δ121 = δ
12
2 = δ =
∆(1,2)
2 . Thus, combining all constraint
sets of all possible partitions, we have the following result constraint set: CΠ := {0 ≤
δ} ∪ {0 ≥ δ} ⇔ δ ∈ [−∞,∞]. It means that for any value of ∆(1, 2), symmetric
relative gain always results in a Nash-stable partition for two players case.
July 3, 2018 1:31 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ppijgtr
14
6.2. Appendix 2: proof of Lemma 2
Note that there are 5 possible partitions in case of N = (1, 2, 3). Thus, according
to equally divided clustering profit, the following variables occur: δ121 = δ
12
2 = δ1,
δ131 = δ
13
3 = δ2, δ
23
2 = δ
23
3 = δ3, δ
123
1 = δ
123
2 = δ
123
3 = δ4. Enumerating all possible
partitions results in the following conditions:
(1) Π = {(1), (2), (3)}:
δ1 ≤ 0, δ2 ≤ 0, δ3 ≤ 0, (35)
(2) Π = {(1, 2), (3)}:
δ1 ≥ 0, δ1 ≥ δ2, δ1 ≥ δ3, δ4 ≤ 0, (36)
(3) Π = {(1, 3), (2)}:
δ2 ≥ 0, δ2 ≥ δ1, δ2 ≥ δ3, δ4 ≤ 0, (37)
(4) Π = {(2, 3), (1)}:
δ3 ≥ 0, δ3 ≥ δ1, δ3 ≥ δ2, δ4 ≤ 0, (38)
(5) Π = {1, 2, 3}:
δ4 ≥ 0. (39)
Note that the constraint set CΠ covers all values in δ1, δ2, δ3 in case of δ4 ≥ 0.
Further, it also covers all values when δ4 ≤ 0. We are able to draw it since there
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are three dimensions:
δ1
δ2
δ3
-∞
-∞∞
∞
δ4 ≤ 0
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